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RUSSIAN POLITICS OF MASCULINITY AND THE DECAY OF 
FEMINISM: THE ROLE OF DISSENT IN CREATING NEW 
"LOCAL NORMS" 
ALEXANDRA V. 0RLOVA* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, the Russian state has been deliberately 
pursuing politics of masculinity that aim to actively undermine femi-
nist dissenting voices by presenting feminism as something that is 
foreign and inappropriate for the Russian context. This Article ex-
amines why Russian domestic feminism has failed to generate are-
examination of entrenched gender stereotypes and barriers in Russia. 
The Article concludes that in order to effectively combat gender 
stereotyping and reduce structural barriers that continuously rele-
gate women to the private sphere, new "local norms" based on gender 
equality need to develop. In order for these new local norms to gain 
public acceptance, the role of "translators," such as civil society and 
domestic activists, cannot be underestimated. Unfortunately, in to-
day's Russia, such "translation" work is highly discouraged by the 
state. The Russian state is simply unwilling to cede some of its power 
and account for dissent in order to advance gender equality, as op-
posed to its current politics of masculinity. 
INTRODUCTION 
I. THE MASCULINIZATION OF THE STATE AND THE DECAY 
OF FEMINISM 
A. The Pussy Riot Sentencing Decision (2012) 
II. CHALLENGING THE MAsCULINITY OF THE STATE 
A. Gender Stereotyping: Markin v. Russia Case 
B. Entrenching Patterns of Gendered Violence 
CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the Russian state has deliberately pur-
sued politics of masculinity that aim not only to relegate women's 
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rights into the private sphere, defining them in terms of concerns 
and preferences-rather than as something the state has an obliga-
tion to enforce-but also to actively undermine feminist dissenting 
voices by presenting feminism as something that is foreign and 
inappropriate for the Russian context. While the #Me Too movement 
is gaining momentum in the West, resulting in the re-examination 
of entrenched gender stereotypes and barriers, this Article examines 
why Russian domestic feminism is not able to generate a similar re-
examination of values within Russia. 
Part I of the Article examines the gradual masculinization of the 
Russian state, the rise of gendered discourses that present feminism 
as a Western imposition, and the reasons for the decline of the 
Russian domestic feminist movement. It looks at the sentencing 
decision in the Pussy Riot case, and discusses the difficulties experi-
enced by feminist dissenters who attempt to serve as "translators" 
of Western feminist values. The Article further looks at how the 
Pussy Riot decision was used to send a powerful message to Russian 
human rights activists to stop challenging the state's genderized 
politics. Part II looks at the position of the Russian state in regards 
to "third-generation" human rights and traditional cultural norms, 
vocalized as "unchangeable local culture." Part of this positioning 
involves the Russian state's active perpetuation of gender stereotyp-
ing, as represented in the Markin decision by the Russian Constitu-
tional Court.1 The last section of Part II examines the role of the 
Russian judiciary in supporting and reinforcing the state's politics 
ofmasculinity, as well as the legislative perpetuation of patterns of 
gender violence, by looking at the 2017 amendments to the Russian 
Criminal Code that decriminalize certain forms of domestic 
violence.2 The Article concludes that in order to effectively combat 
gender stereotyping and reduce the structural barriers that continu-
ously relegate women to the private sphere, new "local norms" based 
on gender equality need to develop. In order for these new local 
norms to gain public acceptance, the role of "translators," such as 
civil society and domestic activists, cannot be underestimated. Un-
fortunately, in today's Russia, such "translation" work is highly dis-
couraged by the state. The Russian state is unwilling to cede some 
of its power and account for dissent in order to advance gender 
equality, as opposed to its current politics of masculinity. 
1. Opredeleniye Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossi.iskoi Federatsii ot 15 Y anvarya 2009 
g [Ruling of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Jan. 15, 2009], GARANT.RU, 
2009, No. 187-0-0. 
2. See infra Section II.B. 
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I. THE MAsCULINIZATION OF THE STATE AND THE 
DECAY OF FE:MINISM 
61 
As President Vladimir Putin solidified his rule and reasserted 
state control over many aspects ofRussian life, a gradual masculiniza-
tion of the state and a decline offeminism resulted. At first, the presi-
dent's masculinity was used to project the idea that he was capable of 
restoring Russia's global stature. 3 However, soon ccmasculinity politics 
became central to the new state-engineered mobilization."4 Gendered 
discourses are deliberately used for the dual purposes of nation 
building and branding, where "the border between gendered Us and 
Others" is created and perpetuated. 5 For example, the government 
invested heavily in the project of creating various "state-friendly'' 
youth groups infused with heteronormative, male-dominated ideol-
ogy. 6 At the same time, many opposition movements and their leaders 
were deliberately feminized and portrayed in non-heteronormative 
ways, in an attempt to discredit the "moral values" of their policies 
and portray them as personally weak.7 For example, during one of 
the pro-Kremlin youth camps, photoshopped pictures of various 
opposition leaders dressed up as transvestite prostitutes were dis-
tributed. 8 Furthermore, given Russia's current conflict with Ukraine 
over the annexation of Crimea, Russian media has actively engaged 
in the ((demasculinization'' of Ukraine, by actively using gender meta-
phors portraying Ukraine as a "picky girl" and "flighty ... mistress," 
and generally presenting Ukraine as a state under "external control" 
that is "weak, dependent, and mixed up."9 Thus, gender has been 
turned into a political trigger in order to mainstream an ideology of 
((traditional values." 
The regime has chosen the discourse of utraditional values" to 
create an "alternative intellectual space," rather than just a physical 
space, for anti-Western resistance. 10 Thus, gendered discourses have 
been used to maintain physical borders and possibly to expand intel-
lectual ones, and are thus inextricably tied to Russian masculine 
3. Janet Elise Johnson, Pussy Riot as a Feminist Project: Russia's Genderedlnformal 
Politics,42 NATIONAIJTIES PAPERS 583, 583-85 (2014). 
4. I d. at 585. 
5. Liudmila Voronova, Gender Politics of the "War of Narratives": Russian TV-News 
in the Times of Conflict in Ukraine, 9 CATALAN J. COMM. & CULTURAL STUD. 217, 219 
(2017). 
6. Johnson, supra note 3, at 585. 
7. Voronova, supra note 5, at 219, 227. 
8. Johnson, supra note 3, at 585. 
9 . Voronova, supra note 5, at 226-27 (citation omitted). 
10. I d. at 218--19, 224. 
62 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 25:059 
versions of national security and the country's role in international 
politics. 11 Gendered discourses are particularly useful in this creation 
and demarcation of borders, because "gender discourse allows for 
'humanizing' the national community, making it closer to the every-
day experiences of the person and ensuring the functioning of'banal 
nationalism.' "12 Given the state's heavy investment in maintaining 
its "moral sovereignty'' based on "traditional values," the politics of 
masculinity have been used to blame feminism for various social 
problems, to perpetuate gender stereotyping, 13 and to further pro-
mote anti-Western attitudes, portraying feminism and pro-gay rights 
movements as Western "moral colonialism" designed to weaken 
Russia's geopolitical stance.14 For example, "[the] construction of 
neologism 'Gayropa' that appeared in the Russian discourses in the 
2010s in order to point to homosexuality ... as 'the essence of the 
European lifestyle,' making Europe a 'degenerate civilization' and 
Russia-a 'bastion of moral principles.' "15 The politics of masculinity 
certainly contributed to the 2013 federal anti-gay propaganda laws 
that provide fines for "[p]ropaganda of non-traditional sexual rela-
tions among minors" and stigmatize non-reproductive sex.16 The 
politics of masculinity also gave a public platform to views that urged 
women not to provoke men to rape by wearing revealing clothing.17 
Feminism was blamed for "40 million [Russian] women who do not 
have husbands and experience deep unhappiness."18 Most recently, 
a video advertisement calling on Russians to vote in the presidential 
elections on March 18, 2018, which went viral in Russia, painted the 
"future facing those who fail to show up at the polls ... with a slew 
of comically absurd laws."19 However, "the most egregious outcome 
11. Seeid. 
12. ld. at 220 (quoting MICHAEL BILLIG, BANAL NATIONALISM (1995)). 
13. See T A Volkova & NA. Volkov, Realizatsiya Printsipa Gendernogo Ravenstua 
v Souremennoy Rossii, 19 VESTNIK KEMGUKI ZHURNAL TEORETICHESKIKH I PRIKLADNYKH 
ISSLEDOVANIY 244-46 (2012) (Russ.). 
14. See Oleg Riabov & Tatiana Riabova, The Remasculinization of Russia? Gender, 
Nationalism, and th£ Legitimation of Power Under Vladimir Putin, 61 PROBS. POST· 
COMMUNISM 23, 25, 31-32 (2014). 
15. Voronova, supra note 5, at 226 (quoting Riabov & Riabova, supra note 14, at 27). 
16. Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Stat'yu 5 Federal'nogo Zakona o 
Zashchite Detey ot Informatsii Pri.chinyayushchey Vred ikh Zdorov'yu I Razvitiyu [Federal 
Law on Amending Article 5 of the Federal Law on Protection of Children from Information 
Harmful to Their Health and Development], RoSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] July 2, 2013. 
17. Johnson, supra note 3, at 585. 
18. Id.; see also Olga Gumanova & Tatiana Barkhatova, Zhenshiny-Sushestua 
Vtorogo Sorta?, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 10, 2011, 7:19AM), https:/lwww.pravda.ru/faithlreli 
gions/orthodoxy/10-03-2011/1069463-adamieva-0 [https;//perma.cc/7T8V-FU4B] (Russ.). 
19. Russians Threatened with Conscription and Gay Homestays in Presidential Cam-
paign Ad, Moscow TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018, 2:02PM), https://themoscowtimes.com/news 
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of the man's decision not to vote is a law assigning each family with 
a 'gay homestay' for a week."20 In the advertisement, the man's wife 
says "[i]f he doesn't find himself a pair, then you'll have to be with 
him."21 "The law is the law," a flamboyantly dressed gay man says to 
his host "before suggestively biting into a banana."22 The video is 
clearly designed to reinforce the image of the Russian president as a 
protector of heterosexual masculinity from outside threats. While the 
regime has actively constructed feminism as a Western import that 
has no place in Russia, concern about women's issues is certainly not 
new. Domestic feminism started to take root in Russia with some local 
adaptations, especially concerning issues of violence within families 
and female poverty following the collapse of the Soviet Union.23 
The Russian feminist movement started to emerge after the 
1917 Revolution, when the first Soviet Constitution formally pro-
claimed male and female equality in 1917.24 However, by the 1930s 
the Soviet government claimed that women's issues were largely 
solved.25 For seventy years of Soviet rule, each and every Soviet Con-
stitution proclaimed a commitment to formal equality, while refus-
ing to recognize the paternalism of power. The Soviet state, while 
proclaiming its commitment to gender equality, perpetuated a divi-
sion of functions between males and females and continuously used 
women to solve economic and demographic problems.26 In other 
words, constitutionally prescribed gender equality did not translate 
into popular cultural norms, and women were kept out of political 
decision-making.27 In the 1980s women's issues were being openly 
discussed, and then in the 1990s, the Russian feminist movement 
experienced a period of growth. 28 In part, such growth was prompted 
''by grants from Western foundations, such as the Open Society 
Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, IREX, and the Fulbright 
lrussians-threatened-with-conscription-gay-homestays-presidential-campaign-ad-60555 
[https://perma.ccJQ7JC-D58J]. For instance, the video depicts a "52-year-old man dream-
[ing] that he is drafted into a multi-ethnic army, harassed by a communist son for dona-
tions and forced to limit his daily number of bathroom visits." Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Johnson, supra note 3, at 586. 
24. Volkova & Volkov, supra note 13, at 243. 
25. Id. 
26. N.L. Pushkareva, Gde Bolshe Vlasti---Tam Men'she Zhenschin (Gendemaya 
Eksperliza Zakonodatelstua I Tekuschei Zakonotvorcheskoi Deyatel'nosti Vysshih Organov 
Vlasti RF 1991-2006 gg), 1 NAUCHNYE VEDOMOSTI BELGU SER. ISTORIYA POIJTOLOGIYA. 
EKONOMIKA. !NFORMATIKA 118--19 (2008) (Russ.). 
27. Id. at 119. 
28. Natalia Pushkareva & Maria Zolotukhina, Women's and Gender Studies of the 
Russian Past: Two Contemporary Trends, 27 WoMEN'S HIST. REv. 71, 76 (2018). 
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program."29 However, the 2000s saw the decline of feminism in par-
ticular, and Western ideas more generally, in Russian socio-legal 
consciousness, especially as the Russian state commenced its pur-
suit of a "traditional values" campaign and enacted laws designating 
NGOs, receiving Western funding, as "foreign agents."3° Currently, 
the only women's rights NGOs allowed to operate in Russia, without 
harassment and intimidation, are ones dedicated to the study and 
support of families with a traditional division of roles and to stem-
ming the integration of Western ideas into Russian women's move-
ments and academic research. 31 The state is actively engaged in 
propagating the idea that the main function of the family is repro-
ductive.32 State crackdown on foreign-funded NGOs is pursued with 
the explicit purpose of rendering unacceptable "Western 'permissive' 
attitudes towards sexual minorities, gay marriage, small families 
and reduced fertility as well as feminism itself."33 
While the Russian Constitution continues the tradition of pro-
claiming gender equality in s.19(3), 34 Russian popular culture keeps 
voicing the idea that feminism is "not normal," as "normaf' women 
should prefer family and children over the struggle for rights and 
equality with men. 35 The Russian state, through various pronatalist 
policies, 36 is actively trying to bring women within the framework of 
marriage and reinforce the idea that all female relationships with 
the state should be mediated through the prism of marriage, which 
in tum is based on a model of male provider and female dependent. 
In a sense, the state is attempting to insert heterosexual marriage 
based on "traditional values" as a "necessary part of women's public 
legal identities."37 Feminism remains increasingly marginalized in 
29. Id. 
30. Federafnyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Otdel'nyye Zakonodatel'nyye Akty 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel'nosti Nek.ommercheskikh Organizat-
siy, Vypolnyayushchikh Funktsii Inostrannogo Agenta [Federal Law on Amending Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding Regulation of Activities of Non-
Profit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent], RossnsKAIA GAZETA 
[Ros. GAZ.] July 23,2012. 
31. Pushk:areva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79. 
32. Vladimir M. Puchnin & Sergei V. Shunyaev, Znachenie Definitsii, Sostavlyauschih 
Ponyatie "Nasilie v Sem'e," Kak Asotsial'nogo Yavleniya, Posyagauschego na Svobodu 
Lichnosti, 12 VESTNIK TAMBOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA. SERIYA: GUMANITARNYYE NAUKI 
310, 313-14 (2010) (Russ.). 
33. Pushkareva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79 (footnote omitted). 
34. Push.k:areva, supra note 26, at 121-22. 
35. Olga Voronina, Has Feminist Philosophy a Future in Russia? 34 SIGNS 252, 252 
(2009). 
36. Ariela Dubler et al., Women$ Rights: Reframing the Issues for the Future, 12 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333, 339 (2003). 
37. Id. at 339-40, 350. 
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Russia, and explicit anti-feminist statements are heard more and 
more frequently. 38 Russian women's organizations prefer to engage 
in issue-specific struggles, such as helping victims of family violence, 
or even the struggle for labour rights, but they do not generally en-
gage in critiquing structural discrimination and gender stereotyping 
against women in Russian society.39 Russian women academics, re-
searchers, and activists remain, for the most part, excluded from 
global feminist and gender networks.40 Some Russian women's or-
ganizations also feel that receiving foreign donor money, and being 
told how to shape and proceed with their agendas, involve echoes of 
imperialism, and thus, should be avoided. 41 This critique is not just 
a point of pride, but is in part shaped by granting history ofthe 1990s, 
leading to the perception that: 
fads and fashions of donors' changing priorities for funding-
such as first supporting work connected with domestic violence 
and crisis centres and then switching away from them to call for 
attention to human trafficking--often means just short-term 
backing for serious projects before further redefinition, thus leav-
ing organizations without help unless they hastily remodel or 
repackage themselves. 42 
Thus, few grants coming from foreign donors are seen as actually 
enabling activists to address, in a sustained fashion, the structural 
forms of discrimination experienced by Russian women. 
In response to these local manifestations of feminism, the regime 
invested heavily in attracting high-profile women into the Russian 
political landscape; however, women in government are often" 'show-
girls,' a feminized version of 'locomotives,' a widespread informal 
practice of nominating big names, such as celebrities, singers and 
athletes (including a ballerina, a rhythmic gymnast and a former 
Playboy model) to attract voters, some of whom then decline to 
serve."43 In other words, women are included for the sake of appear-
ances and are frequently used to promote anti-feminist initiatives. 
For example, Russian Parliamentarian, Y elena Mizulina, has pro-
moted both the anti-gay propaganda law and the amendments 
38. Pushkareva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79. 
39. Voronina, supra note 35, at 254. 
40. ld. 
41. Amrita Basu, Who Secures Women~ Capabilities in Martha Nussbaum's Quest 
for Social Justice? 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201, 201, 204 (2010). 
42. Mary Buckley, The Politics Surrounding Gender Issues and Domestic Vwlence in 
Russia: What Is to Be Done, By Whom and How? J. CO:MMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 
435, 442 (2010). 
43. Johnson, supra note 3, at 587--88 (citation omitted). 
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decriminalizing certain instances of domestic violence, while Parlia-
mentarian Yekaterina Lakhova has lobbied for Russia's infamous 
anti-Magnitsky (Dima Yakovlev) law.44 This law creates a list of 
foreigners banned from entering Russia, suspends the activity of 
NGOs receiving foreign funding, and bans United States' citizens 
from adopting Russian children. 45 The public perception of politics 
remains genderized (i.e., politics are seen as the domain ofmen).46 
Apart from a few prominent high-positioned women, women in 
Russian civil service tend to be concentrated in positions where they 
do not make significant political decisions.47 At the same time, civil 
service attracts a significant share of women, who in turn, become 
dependent on the state for their economic survival, and hence, 
reluctant to challenge genderized state policies. In a sense, women 
are co-opted into the politics of masculinity pursued by the regime 
and rewarded for their loyalty. Those who refuse to play by the rules 
and argue against the mainstream establishment are punished and 
delegitimized.48 A recent sexual harassment scandal, involving several 
Russian female journalists and a State Duma deputy, illustrated the 
pervasiveness of this phenomenon in Russian genderized politics. 49 
The international incident around the women in Pussy Riot, 
who staged a "punk prayer'' in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in 
Moscow, and their subsequent trial and harsh prison sentences, il-
lustrate the states' severe response to those challenging its vision of 
Russia's moral stance and to women "behaving in unfeminine ways."50 
44. See The Dima Yakovlev Law: Ethical Implications of the Russian Adoption Ban, 
GEOHISTORY (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.geohistory.today/dima-yakovlev-law-ethics 
[https://perma.cdMYY7-8RSB]; Shaun Walker, Fury at Russian Move to Soften Domestic 
Vwlence Law, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2017, 9:56 PM), https:/lwww.theguardian.com/world 
/20 17/jan/19/russian-soften-domestic-violence-law-decriminali.se-womens-rights [https:// 
perma.cdGEP2-N2BH]; see, e.g., Sewell Chan, Russia$ 'Gay Propaganda' Laws Are Illegal, 
European Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https:/lwww.nytimes.com/2017/06/20 
lworld/europe/russia-gay-propaganda.html [https://perma.cdE49N-EL66]; Mary Zelenova, 
Invisible Children: Russia's Dima Yakovleu Law, NAOC (Feb. 1, 2017), http://natoasso 
ciation.calinvisible-children-russias-dima-yakovlev-law [https://perma.cc!H8UV-VTGH]. 
45. Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Merakh Vozdeystviya na Lits, Prichastnykh k Narusheni-
yam Osnovopolagayushchikh Prav I Svobod Cheloveka, Prav I Svobod Grazhdan 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law On Measures to Influence Individuals Involved In 
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, Rights and Freedoms of 
Citizens of the Russian Federation], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] Dec. 29, 2012. 
46. Pushkareva, supra note 26, at 122. 
47. ld. at 123. 
48. ld. at 124. 
49. Oksana Pushkina, Russian Deputy Vows to Criminalize Sexual Harassment After 
Duma Scandal, Moscow TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:02 PM), https:/lthemoscowtimes.com 
/news/russian-deputy-vows-criminalize-sexual-harassment-after-duma-scandal-60640 
[https://perma.cc/KH2U-GRE5]. 
50. Peter Rutland, The Pussy Riot Affair: Gender and National Identity in Putin's 
Russia, 42 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 575, 575, 579 (2014). 
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Those challenging the states' vision present an asymmetrical chal-
lenge to the states' carefully cultivated "legitimacy ... based on a 
heavily masculinized image."51 
A. The Pussy Riot Sentencing Decision (2012) 
The Pussy Riot case stems from the arrest of three women in 
March of 2012.52 Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria Alekhina, and 
Yekaterina Samutsevich were charged with criminal hooliganism 
motivated by religious hatred. 53 On the morning of February 21, 
2012, several women entered Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Mos-
cow.54 Upon entering the cathedral, they dumped their backpacks in 
a pile, took off their outerwear to reveal short colourful dresses, put 
balaclavas on their faces, crossed the gate separating the nave from 
the iconostasis and altar, plugged in an amplifier for an electric 
guitar, and began singing and dancing.55 On August 17, 2012, the 
three women were convicted and each sentenced to two years of im-
prisonment. 56 Witnesses called by the court and the accused dis-
agreed about the lyrics. 57 The accused women claimed that they said 
"Holy Mother, drive out Putin" and "Holy Mother, become a femi-
nist."118 The prosecution's witnesses claimed that the women cursed 
and insulted God and the Church. 59 
In addition to the content of the accused's lyrics, the inappropri-
ate dresses, and the behavior, most of the prosecution's witnesses 
were "particularly dismayed that women had violated a sacred space 
reserved exclusively for men" and strongly objected to that fact. 60 All 
of the prosecution's witnesses testified that there was nothing 
political in the women's words, actions, or gestures, and all their 
actions were premeditated, malicious blasphemy, designed to at-
tract media attention, including foreign media. 61 The witnesses for 
51. ld. at 579. 
52. Id. at 577. 
53. Id. 
04. Rutland, supra note 50, at 576; see also Prigovor Pussy Riot, SNOB.RU 24, 24 
(Aug. 22, 20 12), https://snob.ru/selectedlentry/51999 [https://perma.cc/5LLK-ZSJC]. 
55. Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 27. 
56. Pussy Riot v. Russia, CaseNo.1-170/ 12 (Aug. 17, 2012), http:/lglobalfreedomofex 
pression.columbia.edu/caseslpussy-riot-vs-russia [https://perma.cc/M7PW-PBDH]; see 
also Rutland, supra note 50, at 577. 
57. Catherine Schuler, Reinventing the Show Trial Putin and Pussy Riot, 57 TDR 7, 
11 (2013). 
58. Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 25. 
59. Seeid. 
60. Schuler, supra note 57, at 12. 
61. Id. 
68 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 25:059 
the defense were more harmful than helpful to the accused's case.62 
Most of the witnesses limited themselves to short generic statements 
that the accused were good students, good mothers, and not aggressive 
in their interactions. 63 Yekaterina Samutsevich's father stated that he 
was surprised that his daughter-who was always a good girl until 
she fell under the influence of Nadezhda Tolokonnikova--decided to 
follow feminism. 64 He stated that, in his view, feminism is antithetical 
to Russian civilization and is for the West, not for Russia.65 Another 
point of note is that the judgment makes it clear in its description of 
the collected evidence, that only Nadezhda Tolokonnikova's apartment 
was searched.66 The judgment, on several occasions, emphasizes 
that during the search of Tolokonnikova's apartment, which she 
shared with her husband, the police located a Canadian passport held 
by her husband and Tolokonnikova's Canadian permanent resident 
card, as well as her Canadian Social Insurance Number and provin-
cial health card.67 Thus, the court strongly implied the possibility of 
"foreign influence."68 
In their response to the accusations of hate crimes, the women, 
especially Tolokonnikova, argued that they were not motivated by 
religious hatred, but rather, were trying to mount a political protest 
in an artistic form.69 Their main complaints included the suppres-
sion of dissent by the Russian state, anti-gay propaganda laws, and 
the inappropriate support by the Church ofPutin's presidency. 70 The 
women also objected to traditional patriarchal families, where women 
are deemed less important and subordinate to men. 71 This objection 
to patriarchy is what motivated the women to enter the area of the 
Church-traditionally reserved for men-and to call for the Mother 
of God to become a feminist. 72 N adezhda Tolokonnikova, arguably 
the most vocal of Pussy Riot's members, stated: 
[w]ho could have supposed that history, in particular the still 
recent history of Stalin's terror, would not be taught at all? It 
makes you want to weep, looking at how methods of the medi-
eval inquisition reign over security and judicial systems in the 
62. Seeid. 
63. Seeid. 
64. Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 33. 
65. ld. 
66. ld. at 34-35. 
67. Id. 
68. Schuler, supra note 57, at 13. 
69. Id. at 12. 
70. See Prigovar Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 26. 
71. ld. 
72. See id. at 39. 
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Russian Federation, which is our country. From the moment of 
our arrest we could not weep anymore, we have forgotten how to 
cry; we shouted in despair at our punk concerts, as we could and 
as we knew how, about the lawlessness of bosses and of power, 
but now they've stolen our voices. 73 
69 
The court concluded that the accused's actions were motivated 
by hatred for Orthodox believers and caused significant emotional 
and moral damage to the employees and parishioners present in the 
Church on the day of the "punk prayer," as well as to every Chris-
tian globally who saw the video posted on the Internet.74 The court's 
conclusions completely discounted the artistic and political nature 
of the accused's actions. Moreover, the court's conclusion about the 
presence of religious hatred seemed, in part, to be based on a nega-
tive view of feminism. Specifically, the court stated that: 
[ c]urrently, individuals following the feminist movement are fight-
ing for gender equality in political, family, and sexual relations. 
While following the ideology of feminism does not constitute a 
crime or another type of an offence in the Russian Federation, a 
number of religions, such as Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam, 
cannot be reconciled with the ideas of feminism. While feminism 
does not represent a religious ideology, the followers of feminism 
are interfering with such public spheres as public morals, norms of 
propriety, family relations, and sexual relations, all ofw hich have 
been historically built on the basis of religious principles. Thus, 
espousing the superiority of one ideology over others, leads to hate 
and strife. This hate, including religious hate, has been conclu-
sively proven as a motivation behind the actions of the accused. 75 
In this way, the court's judgment makes it clear that feminism, and 
those who espouse it, will be viewed as undermining the state's 
concept of public good, and will be dealt with harshly. 
Despite the portrayals of the women from Pussy Riot as engag-
ing in behaviour that was not only "un-Russian" in its open align-
ment with feminism, but also possibly subversive of Russian national 
security-some claiming that it was catering directly to Western 
audiences and influences-the idea of the artistic and intellectual 
community standing up to the state has deep roots in Russian 
culture, in both the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods. 76 As one 
73. Schuler, supra note 57, at 15 (citation omitted). 
7 4. See Prigouor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 27. 
75. I d. at 40 (translated by author). 
76. See Pushkareva, supra note 26, at 80. 
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author put it, "the lack of space for critical political action in the 
public sphere meant that the responsibility for questioning authority 
fell to artists and writers.'m However, it is also clear that the Pussy 
Riot trial was predetermined to focus on religion, and by extension 
on reasserting Russia's moral sovereignty and superiority over the 
West, rather than examining politics and art. 78 In the end, the Pussy 
Riot trial was used by the Russian state to highlight and reinforce 
its anti-Western stance, in part, due to the fact that the pro-feminist 
attitudes of Pussy Riot members were perceived by the Russian 
general public as part of a Western conspiracy to weaken Russia. 
However, Western feminist thinking has not penetrated Russian 
society. In a sense, 
Pussy Riot became evidence for the threat posed by the West's 
moral nihilism, undermining the "Orthodox majority" that was 
portrayed as representing the core of the Russian nation. There 
was indeed a conspiracy afoot--but it was one orchestrated by 
the Russian state, against the opposition.79 
One of the key reasons that the women of Pussy Riot received such 
severe treatment was their questioning of the masculinized heteronor-
mative campaign for "traditional values," and their attempting to 
serve as "translators" of Western feminist values, by vernacularizing 
those values for a Russian audience. After all, "[t]he transformation 
of the 'other's' concept into 'your own' (including the transformation of 
the 'other's' feminism in its Russian version) must take the form of 
an individual interiorization of some of its concepts."80 The Russian 
state is determined to suppress such dissenting voices, and hence, 
the women of Pussy Riot were cynically used by the state to send a 
message to both Western human rights campaigners and Russian 
human rights activists.81 
II. CHALLENGING THE MASCULINITY OF THE STATE 
Following the Pussy Riot case, President Putin, in his December 
2013 state of the nation address, declared that many Western coun-
tries are determined to redefine moral norms and erase national 
77. Rutland, supra note 50, at 576. 
78. Id. at 577. 
79. I d. at 581. 
80. Push.k.areva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79. 
81. See Brian Whitmore, Vladimir Putin, Conservative Icon, ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2013), 
https:/lwww .theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/v ladimir-putin-conservative 
-icon/282572 [https://perma.cc/F2V 4-EWQ2]. 
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traditions and cultural differences.82 This forces societies not only to 
recognize perfectly legitimate rights protecting freedom of conscience, 
political freedom, and private life, but also to equate good and evil 
due to the undermining of traditional values. Putin stated that it is 
Russia's duty to protect traditional values, including traditional 
families.83 Putin also noted that the world supports Russia's "de-
fense of traditional values" against "genderless and infertile" toler-
ance. 84 Such position taken by the Russian President, and echoed by 
prominent Russian politicians, inevitably makes the assumption 
that the concept of "traditional values" is an easily definable one 
and, moreover, that it is stable.85 In reality, the sustainability and 
stability of these concepts are secured by those who get to tell the 
story, and thus, determine the definition of the truth.86 The Russian 
state is deliberately engaging in "confirming the normality of the 
Selfby naming the deviance of the Other."87 This Russian position-
ing, regarding certain human rights, such as gender equality, is not 
uncommon, since "[t]hose who resist human rights often claim to be 
defending culture."88 Local norms, of course, are not necessarily 
''bounded, immutable, and well settled."89 Nonetheless, if cultural 
norms are constantly presented and conceptualized as immutable, 
this impacts how social change is imagined by both the state and 
those involved in social movements. 90 
The Russian state has certainly propagated the idea of an 
unchangeable local culture, and has positioned itself as a defender 
of this culture, and by extension of the Russian people, from harmful 
outside influences. The Pussy Riot case provides a powerful illustra-
tion of state resistance to the idea of feminism and the promotion of 
"traditional family" pronatalist policies.91 Despite the Russian state's 
82. See id.; N.S. Semenova, Traditsionnye Tsennosti v. "Prava LGBT' V Ramkah 
Realizatsii Prava Na Obrazovanie: Mezhdunarodno-Pravivoi Podhod, 6 VESTNIK RUDN 
82, 86 (2016) [in Russian]. 
83. Semenova, supra note 82, at 86-87. 
84. Marko Duman, Russia's Conservative "Family Values" Are a Sham, Moscow 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2014, 6:09PM), http://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-conservative 
-family-values-are-a-sham-39115 [https://perma.cc/2VAN-VWVC]. 
85. Semenova, supra note 82, at 86-87. 
86. See generally Daniel H. Kaiser, "He Said, She Said'~ Rape and Gender Discourse 
in Early Modern Russia, 3 KRITIKA: EXPLORATIONS IN RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN HIST. 197, 
197 (2002), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/187 41/pdf. 
87. Ralph Sandland, Crossing and Not Crossing: Gender, Sexuality and Melancholy 
in the European Court of Human Rights, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 191, 203 (2003). 
88. Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Transnational Culture: Regulating Gender 
Violence Through Global Law, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 53, 60 (2006). 
89. I d. at 64 (footnote omitted). 
90. ld. 
91. Duman, supra note 84. 
72 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 25:059 
repeated declarations of maintaining and defending "traditional 
values," these values are built on a rather shaky foundation. Russia, 
for instance, has one of the highest divorce rates in the world.92 Its 
abortion rate, similarly, remains one of the highest.93 Working moth-
ers and single mothers are a normalized phenomenon in Russian 
society.94 Moreover, despite its public condemnation ofhomosexual-
ity, "Russia's public space is no stranger to cross-dressing, drag, and 
unorthodox gender-bending," especially when it comes to the Rus-
sian entertainment scene. 95 However, despite recurring challenges 
to the state's "traditional values" discourse, these values continue 
to be propagated by the Russian state through its repeated empha-
sis on the inferiority of so-called third-generation human rights, 
which include various collective rights as well as women's rights.96 
As third-generation rights, such as gender equality, come into in-
creasing conflict with first-generation civil and political rights, the 
discourse of"traditional values" and "cultural norms" is utilized to 
discount the legitimacy of women's claims and to protect the status 
quo.97 After all, while s.19 of the Russian Constitution guarantees 
formal gender equality, women in Russia face a multitude of struc-
tural barriers.98 In part, such barriers persist due to women's rights 
and gender equality being deemed secondary and subservient to 
first-generation civil and political rights, which are targeted much 
more at protecting males from state interference within the public 
realm, than females within the private realm, where the rhetoric of 
"traditional values" continuously pushes women.99 
One of the key issues when it comes to advancing change and 
changing public perceptions of women's rights and feminism is that, 
when cultural norms are perceived as absolutist, the struggle to 
change such norms becomes that much more difficult. Hence, so-
called "translators" or "intermediaries" (people who live and navi-
gate between multiple systems) become key to achieving change. 
The role of such individuals is critical as "human rights ideas are 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Natalia Antonova, No Way Back for Russian Women, Moscow TIMES (Nov. 5, 
2015, 4:11 PM), https://themoscowtimes.oom/articles/8198no-way-back-for-russian-women 
-50650 [https://perma.cc/99DT-HV6H]; see also P.U. Kapustina et al., Gendernye Stereo-
tipy u Studencheskoi Srede, J. SIBERIANMED. SCI. 1, 7 (2014) (Russ.). 
95. Duman, supra note 84. 
96. See N.A. Volkov & T .A. Volkova, Problemy Realizatsii Gendemoi Strategii Rossii 
u Kontekste "Pokolenii" Prav Cheloueka, 29 VESTNIK KEMGUKI 1, 101 (2014) (Russ.). 
97. See id. at 1024>4. 
98. Seeid. 
99. Natsu Taylor Saito, Considering 'Third Generation" International Human Rights 
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appropriated, encouraged, and resisted in many locations around the 
world."100 Within Russia, various voices of dissent continue to chal-
lenge the state's masculinized vision of Russian society. For example, 
in 2016, thousands of women in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus went 
on social media to share their experiences of sexual violence in the 
''#IAm.NotA:fraidToSpeak" flash mob.101 A number of prominent 
Russian women joined this flash mob to share their stories and to 
start challenging the blaming of female victims. 102 While this flash 
mob drew widespread support on the Internet, it also attracted 
significant backlash on social media, claiming that the flash mob 
was caused by the desire for "cheap popularity and attention."103 
Moreover, various church figures stated that stories of sexual vio-
lence should not be posted on the Internet, and that some female 
activists "suffer[ed] from 'exhibitionism,"' since information about 
sexual violence should not be made public.104 The flash mob orga-
nizer's Facebook account was also suspended.105 The politics of 
masculinity pursued by the Russian state, and its insistence on tra-
ditional values and local cultural norms, demonstrate that there are 
"fissures between the global settings where human rights ideas are 
codified into documents and the local communities where the sub-
jects of these rights live and work."106 If the idea of gender equality 
is to be translated into concrete action and have an impact, it would 
need to become "part of the consciousness of ordinary people,"107 
which the state is actively preventing at this point in time. 
A. Gender Stereotyping: Markin v. Russia Case 
Part of the Russian state's static approach to human rights, espe-
cially third-generation rights, and the suppression of dissent by equat-
ing dissenters with harmful foreign influences, involves continuous 
100. Merry, supra note 88, at 55. 
101. Mikhail Fislurum, Russia's Unstoppable Desire for Change, Moscow TIMES 
(July 5, 2017, 4:07PM), http://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-unstoppable-desire 
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state support for gender stereotyping.108 Gender stereotyping is 
certainly not unique to the Russian context.109 Myths and gender 
stereotypes frequently permeate values and laws, especially when 
it comes to women's capacity for roles other than motherhood.110 
Within the Russian context, gender stereotyping is ubiquitous in 
public discourse. m The Russian state frequently resorts to stereo-
typing in order to justify the various human rights infringements 
under the guise of traditional values. 112 Additionally, the state and 
judiciary continually reinforces popular views regarding women 
being primarily concerned with motherhood and childrearing, and 
men being dedicated to providing for the family economically .113 A 
good illustration of judicial approaches to gender stereotyping is 
provided by the case of Markin u. Russia.114 
Konstantin Markin was a Russian military serviceman, serving 
as a radio intelligence operator.115 Markin divorced his wife, and they 
entered into an agreement under which the three children of the 
marriage would live with Markin. 116 He asked the head of his mili-
tary unit for three years' parentalleave.117 The head of the military 
unit rejected Markin's request, because such leave could only be 
granted to female militazy personnel. 118 As a male, Markin was en-
titled to three months' leave.119 Markin brought proceedings against 
his military unit before a military court. 120 Once his claim was dis-
missed, he brought an appeal in front of a military appeals court.121 
The military appeals court upheld the decision of the first-instance 
court denying Markin parental leave, and stated that Markin's 
"reflections on equality between men and women ... [could] not 
108. See Alexandra Timmer, Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of Human 
Rights Can Borrow from American and Canadian Equal Protection Law, 63AM. J. COMP. 
L. 239, 282 (2015). 
109. ld. 
110. ld. 
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serve as a basis for quashing the first-instance judgment, which 
[was] correct in substance."122 
Markin then applied to the Russian Constitutional Court, claim-
ing that the provisions of Russia's Military Service Act, concerning 
the three-year parental leave, were "incompatible with the equality 
clause in the Constitution."123 The Russian Constitutional Court, in 
its judgment of January 15, 2009, rejected his application.124 The 
Constitutional Court emphasized the close connection between mili-
tary service and public interest, and hence the entitlement offederal 
legislators to place limitations on the civil rights and freedoms of 
military personnel.125 The Court further stated that "by signing a 
military-service contract a citizen ... voluntarily chooses a profes-
sional activity which entails ... limitations on his civil rights and 
freedoms inherent in this type of public service."126 
The Court went on to emphasize that a serviceman under con-
tract is entitled to a leave of up to three months under certain 
circumstances, the purpose of such leave being to give him time to 
make arrangements for the care of his child, or to decide whether he 
wishes to take advantage of an early discharge for family reasons. 127 
Finally, the Constitutional Court stated that: 
[o]wing to the specific demands of military service, non-perfor-
mance of military duties by military personnel en masse must be 
excluded as it might be detrimental to the public interests pro-
tected by law .... By granting, on an exceptional basis, the right 
to parental leave to servicewomen only, the legislature took into 
account, firstly, the limited participation of women in military 
service and, secondly, the special role of women associated with 
motherhood.128 
The Court concluded that, in light of the above reasons, giving differ-
ential leave to men and women cannot be regarded as breaching the 
principles of gender equality established by Article 19, Sections 2 
and 3 of the Russian Constitution. 129 
Following the refusal by the Russian Constitutional Court to 
consider Markin's application, he lodged an application with the 
122. I d. at 88. 
123. I d. at 88--89. 
124. I d. at 89. 
125. Id. 
126. ld. 
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).u10 The Chamber of the 
ECtHR, in its October 7, 2010 judgment, found that there had been 
a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Article 8 
(respect for private and family life) of the Convention.131 The ECtHR 
concluded that the denial of parental leave to Markin was based on 
both his military status and sex.132 The ECtHR stated that advance-
ment of gender equality is considered to be a major goal in the 
member States of the Council ofEurope, and thus, states have a small 
margin of appreciation when it comes to this issue and would need 
to provide very weighty reasons to justify gender-based differences 
in treatment.133 The Court was not convinced by the Russian Consti-
tutional Court's argument that, when it came to parental leave, the 
difference in treatment between servicemen and servicewomen was 
justified by the special role of mothers in the upbringing of children. 134 
The ECtHR concluded that when it comes to taking care of children 
during parental leave, both parents are "similarly placed."135 The 
Court noted that the "European consensus" towards a more equal 
sharing of responsibilities for the upbringing of children cannot be 
overlooked when it comes to this issue.136 The ECtHR also pointed 
out that references to "the traditional perception of women as pri-
mary child-carers" do not provide sufficient justification for exclud-
ing fathers from taking parentalleave.137 
As for Markin's military status, the Court pointed out that 
military personnel do not automatically waive their rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights by virtue of joining the 
armed forces.138 The ECtHR was not convinced by the arguments of 
the Russian Constitutional Court that the extension of parental leave 
to servicemen would have a negative effect on the fighting power 
and operational effectiveness of the armed forces. 139 The ECtHR 
compared the arguments of the Russian Constitutional Court to the 
argument made in Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom regarding the 
presence of homosexuals in the army, that homosexuals undermine 
its operational effectiveness. 140 In both cases, there was a lack of 
130. See Markin v. Russia, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4. 
131. I d. at 19; see also Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H. R. at 102--03. 
132. Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13--14. 
133. I d. at 114; see also Markin, 2010-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13. 
134. See Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 115. 
135. Id. 
136. Markin, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14. 
137. Id. at 15. 
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139. ld. at 16--17. 
140. I d. at 16; Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 106. 
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concrete evidence to substantiate such conclusions. 141 Finally, the 
Court noted that neither gender-based prejudices based on the per-
ception of women as caregivers and men as breadwinners, nor the 
fact that women were less numerous in the Russian armed forces, 
justified disadvantaged treatment of servicemen in relation to parental 
leaves.142 Finally, the ECtHR noted that the provisions of Russia's 
Military Service Act produced a widespread problem impacting a 
substantial number of people, and recommended amendments to the 
Military Service Act to put an end to discrimination. 143 
The 2010 decision by the Chamber of the ECtHR prompted a 
strong response by the chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, 
Valery Zorkin. He argued that: 
[the] priority in defining the public interest must reside in the 
state and its authorities, not international judges .... He fur-
ther challenged the chamber's position that considering women 
the primary caretakers of small children was just a "gender 
stereotype." Instead, the special role of mothers in raising their 
children was supported by contemporary psychology. Zorkin also 
criticized the chamber's reliance on the earlier decision in Smith 
& Grady u. United Kingdom, which concerned the rights of homo-
sexual men in the army, arguing that the preoccupation of con-
temporary European lawyers with homosexual rights was taking 
"grotesque forms" that sometimes turned into a "tragedy."144 
It is thus not surprising that the Russian government requested 
that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, which 
issued its judgment on March 22, 2012.145 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR upheld the earlier judgment 
of the Chamber, and similarly concluded that there had been a vio-
lation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 146 
Once again, the ECtHR emphasized the importance of "European 
consensus" in its decisions. 147 The Strasbourg Court stated that "the 
advancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the member 
States of the Council of Europe."148 Regarding the argument about 
the special role of women in the raising of children, the Court noted 
141. Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 106. 
142. ld. at 119. 
143. See id. at 119-21. 
144. La uri Malksoo, International Decisions: Markin v. Russia, 106AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 
839--40 (2012). 
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a gradual evolution of society towards a more equal sharing of respon-
sibility between men and women for the upbringing of children. 149 
The Russian government's characterization of the provisions allowing 
parental leave for female military personnel but not male military 
personnel as ''positive discrimination'' is misconooived. 160 Furthermore, 
the court noted that the differential treatment was "clearly not in-
tended to correct the disadvantaged position of women in society."151 
Quite the opposite, such a difference in treatment has the effect of 
perpetuating gender stereotyping and is "disadvantageous both to 
women's careers and to men's family life."152 The Court also explic-
itly rejected reference to prevailing traditions in a country as a justifi-
cation for the difference in treatment; hence, the perception of women 
as primarily responsible for providing child care and men primarily 
as breadwinners cannot be considered a sufficient justification. 153 
The Court was not persuaded by the Russian government's 
argument that the extension of parental leave to servicemen would 
compromise the fighting power and operational effectiveness of the 
armed forces, while the granting ofparentalleave to servicewomen 
would not pose similar risks due to women being less numerous in 
the military.154 The Russian government failed to present sufficient 
expert studies or statistical research to justify its claim. 155 While the 
ECtHR considered that "it may be justifiable to exclude from the 
entitlement to parental leave any personnel, male or female, who 
may not be easily replaced" due to the nature of their duties-such 
as "hierarchical position, rare technical qualifications or involvement 
in active military actions"-in Russia, the entitlement to parental 
leave depended solely on the sex of the military personnel. 156 Fi-
nally, in relation to the Russian government's argument that Mr. 
Markin waived his right not to be discriminated against by volun-
tarily signing a military contract, the Court stated that "in view of 
the fundamental importance of the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sex, nowaiverofthe right not to be subjected to discrimi-
nation on such grounds can be accepted as it would be counter to an 
important public interest."157 The difference in treatment of service-
men and servicewomen with regards to parental leave could not be 
149. Id. at 117. 
150. Id. at 118. 
151. Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 118. 
152. Id. 
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"reasonably or objectively justified," and thus "amounted to discrim-
ination on [the] grounds of sex."158 
The case of Markin v. Russia makes it clear that in the Russian 
context, not only is gender stereotyping prevalent in public discourse, 
but the discourse is also deliberately being shaped by both the 
Russian state and the Russian courts. A key problem with stereo-
types is that they are taken for granted, to the extent that they are 
almost invisible.159 Hence, in order to make stereotypes visible, 
society must engage in a conscious process of naming and exposing 
said stereotypes. 160 In other words, a conscious shift needs to occur 
from an excessive focus on women's biological capacity, toward viewing 
women as "full human beings and equal members of society ."161 In 
order for such a shift to occur, in addition to explicitly naming 
stereotypes and examining their underlying assumptions, so-called 
"private rights" need to be taken seriously by the state, rather than 
discounted. Conceptualizing women's rights as falling within private 
life and the private sphere risks creating dangerous private spaces, 
where women are left alone with no recourse. 162 Thus, explicitly 
acknowledging the ways in which laws and practices deprive women 
of choices, control, and dignity is essential to "women's issues" being 
viewed as rights to be protected and guaranteed, rather than merely 
moral questions that are part of "traditional values." 
One of the ways that gender stereotyping can be recognized is 
through transformative judicial narratives. Legal reasoning "can ex-
pose and target the invidious cycle wherein stereotyping and dis-
crimination perpetuate each other."163 Courts, especially constitutional 
courts, are uniquely placed in their capacity either to shape and 
transform prevailing social attitudes, or to contribute to the perpet-
uation of violence through the reliance on seemingly neutral legal 
principles.164 The Russian Constitutional Court has so far perpetu-
ated the discourse of masculinity through gender stereotyping and 
insistence on "traditional values" when defining the contours ofhuman 
rights. 165 The case of Markin v. Russia provides a good illustration 
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of conflicting judicial narratives, with the ECtHR attempting to 
name and dismantle existing gender stereotypes, and the Russian 
Constitutional Court actively trying to support and reinforce them. 166 
The two major stereotypes that the Russian Constitutional Court 
relied upon in its reasoning were that women do not play an impor-
tant role in the military, and that women have a special role associ-
ated with motherhood.167 Hence, the Russian Constitutional Court's 
reasoning continues to provide grounds for the Russian state to 
rationalize and justify gender discrimination. 168 The connection be-
tween stereotyping and discrimination is key. 
In order to effectively address discrimination, various premises 
of myths and stereotypes about women need to be openly acknowl-
edged and discussed. 169 The case of Markin v. Russia illustrates the 
limited capacity of the Russian Constitutional Court to engage in 
transformative legal reasoning, as well as its active opposition to the 
ECtHR's reasoning.170 Thus, while foreign legal reasoning gets framed 
as "legal colonialism" by the Russian state, domestic legal reasoning 
is utilized to maintain a particular version of state masculinity.171 
B. Entrenching Patterns of Gendered Violence 
From the review of the Markin v. Russia and Pussy Riot cases, 
it becomes apparent that the Russian judicial system supports and 
reinforces the state's politics of masculinity by "evoking traditional 
notions of family, marriage, and femininity."172 The politics of mas-
culinity, often actualized through the rhetoric of"traditional values" 
and presented as resistance to corrupt Western influences, are con-
tributing to the perpetuation of and further entrenchment of pat-
terns of gender violence. One recent troubling development is the 
February 2017 amendment to s.116 of the Criminal Code of the 
166. Compare Markin v. Russia, 2012-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 104, with Rutland, supra 
note 50, at 581. 
167. Marina L. Shelutto, Realizatsiya Konstitutsionnyh Printsipov Semeinogo Prava 
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168. Timmer, supra note 108, at 284. 
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Russian Federation decriminalizing certain forms of domestic vio-
lence.173 Section 116 deals with physical assault, defined as ''battery 
or similar violent actions, which have caused physical pain but have 
not amounted to light injury."174 This provision was one of the few 
available to prosecute domestic violence. 176 Initially, non-aggravated 
battery under s.116 was a crime punishable by a fine or restrictions 
ofliberty.176 In 2015, a bill decriminalizing non-aggravating battery 
was introduced by the Russian Supreme Court as part of a broader 
effort to liberalize Russian criminal law, and reduce the number of 
imprisoned individuals.177 However, the Supreme Court's bill was 
amended after its first reading in the lower house of Russia's 
legislature-the State Duma-to state that battery of" close persons" 
(i.e., domestic violence) would not be decriminalized and would remain 
punishable under s.116 of the Criminal Code.178 The feminist lobby 
was ''blamed" for this amendment, "carving out'' the exception forcer-
tain forms of domestic violence.179 The Russian conservative lobby, 
headed by Duma deputy Y elena Mizulina (who also successfully lob-
bied for the passage of a law banning so-called "gay propaganda"), 
claimed that criminalizing domestic violence not resulting in injuries, 
was a measure that could potentially criminalize actions of parents 
who hit their children as part of discipline, while individuals inflicting 
similar harm on strangers would not be criminally liable.180 Mizulina 
stated, "[y]ou don't want people to be imprisoned for two years and 
labeled a criminal for the rest of their lives for a slap."181 The conserva-
tive lobbyists viewed criminalization of domestic violence as govern-
mental intervention into family life and private matters. 182 Hence, 
in February 2017, s.116 of the Russian Criminal Code was amended 
173. Federal'nyi Zakon o vnesenii izmeneniya v stat'yu 116 Ugolovnogo kodeksa 
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to remove the following language: "battery of close persons that re-
sulted in physical pain but did not inflict harm or other consequences" 
from the purview ofcriminallaw.183 As a result of the 2017 amend-
ments, only aggravated battery, repeated battery, or battery that re-
sults in harm to the victim's health, remain criminally punishable. 184 
Domestic violence that does not result in injuries was relegated 
to an administrative offence, and could be prosecuted through "pri-
vate prosecutions," leaving the victim responsible for collecting evi-
dence and bringing the case forward. 185 Repeated offences do remain 
criminalized; however, if a person commits the same crime after a 
year has passed, that crime would be construed as an administrative 
offense.186 Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, stated that 
the purpose of the bill was to help build "strong families."187 While 
official statistics on domestic violence are not kept in Russia, 188 
according to the Russian Ministry of the Interior, forty percent of 
violent crimes happen within the family, 189 with women accounting 
for seventy-four percent of Russia's victims.190 According to some 
estimates, approximately 14,000 Russian women die annually due 
to domestic violence.191 While the deaths of 15,000 Soviet soldiers 
during the Afghan war is considered to be a national tragedy, no simi-
lar public outcry exists when it comes to gender violence. 192 
Russia's #IAmNotAfraidToSpeak. flash mob demonstrated not 
only the ever-prevalent nature of gendered violence, but also the 
fear of allowing corrupt police and the judiciary to handle such cases, 
as law is frequently viewed by victims "as a tool of repression rather 
than of liberation."193 Thus, instances of domestic violence are fre-
quently not reported to the police.194 In tum, patterns of violence are 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
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established and legitimated, 195 in part due to the state's refusal to 
take active measures to prevent and prosecute such violence. 196 This 
structural nature of gender violence is further reinforced through 
state policies (such as amendments to decriminalize domestic violence 
that do not result in physical injuries), the media, and the education 
system.197 The decriminalization of certain forms of domestic vio-
lence means that the gap between real and reported violence will 
grow even more. 198 
Violence against women is certainly not a new phenomenon in 
Russia. 199 However, during Soviet rule, this issue was relegated to 
the private realm, and was classified as a "family affair," not fit for 
public debate.200 In view of the formal gender equality proclaimed by 
the Soviet state, to admit that domestic violence posed a serious issue, 
would challenge certain underlying premises of communism. 201 Some 
of the more egregious cases of domestic violence were typically prose-
cuted under the offense of hooliganism. 202 Using the charge of hooli-
ganism allowed for simple policy explanations, such as alcohol 
dependence and crowded living conditions, to address the issue of 
why domestic violence was taking place, while ignoring the struc-
tural conditions of patriarchy and gender discrimination. 203 In to-
day's Russia, when it comes to domestic violence, police only get 
involved in the most severe instances of physical violence, discount-
ing all other instances. 204 Women are frequently blamed for provok-
ing such violence, and are relegated to the category of victims less 
deserving of protection, as opposed to children and the elderly.205 
Hence, as in Soviet times, despite greater public awareness of gender 
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violence in general, and domestic violence more specifically, 206 domes-
tic violence is still "privatized" and conceptualized as a "family affair'' 
by the authorities.207 Russian research dealing with domestic vio-
lence, in a similar vein to Soviet research, also tends to concentrate 
on immediate precipitating factors of gender violence, such as alcohol 
abuse and living in crowded conditions, rather than engage in an 
examination of deeper structural factors.208 Even more troubling, 
surveys of attitudes toward domestic violence have found that males 
in the eighteen to thirty age category demonstrate significant sup-
port of a husband's right to use violence within the family.209 Such 
tolerant attitudes toward domestic violence are in part a response 
to a "patriarchal-nationalist upsurge that espouses the return of 
women to the home, and a renewed stress on women's 'natural pre-
destination' as wives and mothers."210 
It is clear that the Russian state's lack of comprehensive action 
towards cases of gender violence "fosters an environment of impu-
nity" and promotes the perpetuation of violence against women.211 
Moreover, regressive legislative measures, such as the amendment 
to s.116 of the Russian Criminal Code, and the 2013 federal anti-gay 
propaganda law, as well as sustaining gender stereotyping and 
discouraging female dissenters through judicial reasoning, effec-
tively sanction the continuation of violence and perpetuation of 
structural barriers to gender equality.212 The Russian state's failure 
to protect women from violence constitutes a form of gender discrim-
ination, and arguably "denies women their right to equality before 
the law," as well as violating their right to life.213 IDtimately, gender 
violence is about more than its immediate impact on individual women 
or punishment for individual perpetrators. A deeper re-examination 
of the impact of Russia's politics of masculinity has to take place 
within the framework of human rights protections.214 
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CONCLUSION 
The Russian state's deliberate pursuit of the politics of mascu-
linity, steeped in gendered discourses and designed to uphold and 
perpetuate gender stereotypes and silence dissenting voices, not 
only has the effect of sanctioning violence against women but also 
serves to reinforce numerous structural barriers that continuously 
relegate women into the private sphere. Constant emphasis on the 
role of women as wives and mothers is designed to perpetually focus 
on women's biological capacity, and thus relieve the state from its 
obligation to consider gender equality seriously and to enforce 
women's rights, rather than treat those rights as "moral choices."215 
The Russian state has actively suppressed or deliberately discred-
ited feminist dissenting voices, especially when those voices aim to 
serve as "translators" of Western feminist values by vernacularizing 
those values for a Russian audience.216 Social movements have the 
potential to influence state decision-makingprocesses regarding which 
rights should be recognized and when such a recognition should 
occur. Not surprisingly, authoritarian states tend to suppress dis-
senting social movements when the state's intent is to deliberately 
deny certain rights, such as gender equality. 217 Connecting domestic 
dissent to broader international support for women's rights could 
increase women's vulnerability, given the misogynist backlash it 
may trigger. 218 The women of Pussy Riot were cynically used by the 
Russian state to illustrate the state's intolerance for Western hu-
man rights campaigns and Russian human rights activists who 
engage in them. Thus, without the state's backing, feminist ideas and 
ideals will remain just that. llitimately, what many Russian femi-
nist movements fail to demonstrate is that creative forms of women's 
activism are not expressions of"Westernization," but rather of"the 
universal right of women to engage in self-expression."219 
In the long run, the realization of rights, including gender equal-
ity, rests on their public acceptance.22° Formalized legal norms, even 
if they are constitutionally enshrined, can be largely disregarded 
and disobeyed, especially when both the state and the judiciary are 
deliberately perpetuating gender stereotyping and genderized dis-
courses as part of their politics of masculinity directed at the West. 
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In other words, setting something out as a legal norm does not auto-
matically translate into a "real rule" that is popularly accepted.221 
Therefore, to prevent and respond to violence against women, as 
well as to combat entrenched gender stereotyping and the state's 
resistance to change, measures "must go beyond the state to the 
private sphere" to address "deeply entrenched social and cultural 
norms, institutionalized in the law and political structures and em-
bedded in local and global economies."222 Development of new "local 
norms" based on gender equality has to take place at the local level, 
since local norms can be both "paths to change as well as barriers."223 
However, in order for these new local norms to take root, the role of 
"translators," such as civil society and domestic activists, cannot be 
underestimated. 224 In the specific context of Russia, such work of 
"translation'' is continuing to prove difficult and is highly discour-
aged by the state. That said, dissenting voices do continue to accu-
mulate, as illustrated by the '~IAmNotMraidToSpeak" movement, 
and hopefully will be able to achieve local critical mass. What is 
desperately needed in Russia is sustained opposition constantly 
challenging the ideology of masculine dominance and connecting 
these challenges to broader human rights principles.225 However, 
while human rights law has the potential to break down the "other-
ness" of categories, challenging the heterosexual nature of marriage 
and women's positioning as "caretakers,"226 the role of law, and 
specifically human rights law, appears to be limited in the current 
Russian situation. Overall, "[g]iven the reality of male dominance 
in state and international institutions, and the manner in which 
male traits underpin state relations, it is hardly surprising that the 
state is implicated in the maintenance of power structures that 
continuously reinforce the oppression of women."227 In order to 
advance gender equality, the Russian state will need to deliberately 
cede some of its power and account for dissent, which it seems to be 
unwilling to do at this moment in time. 
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